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I. Introduction
Whether or not "paradigm" (1), as a word, is or is not an overstate-
ment, in this essay I will identify the differences between and the
sources of two policy programs. From the journalistic (popular) stand-
point, policy differences stand out most vividly when programs are com-
pared. But often the real differences lie at the underpinnings. What are
these underpinnings? Are they at the theory level (where most econo-
mists generally believe such matters start), or do they appear, as I
believe, long before particular theories are selected and examined?
Should one dispense with opening the examination at the theoretical
level? Indeed, is the study of where to start (at the level of policy, at
the level of theory, or even deeper) really the economist's problem?
Had this better be left to methodologists and philosophers? I think not
(2). I undertake a different course and suggest that we start not with
the theories but with the consideration of two policy programs, which I
will try to synthesize. Thereafter, I will use personal nouns to describe
the theoretical tents housing these policies. Finally, I hope that we can
agree on looking at the ground where the underpinnings are anchored.
(1) What "paradigm" means depends upon the choice of dictionaries.
Some think that a paradigm is a synonym for ideal type; others
identify the word with a completely new set of ideas as, for exam-
ple, modern chemistry, built on a theory of elements, replaced the
earlier phlogiston explanation. I use the word in the former sense.
(2) There is a recurrent theme in many of the histories of our disci-
pline that there is a distinction between the "economic science"
(where real "truths" lie) and "economic policy" (which reflects the
self interest of factions). In his early [Schumpeter, 1914] work on
the history of economic analysis, Joseph Schumpeter [1954] consid-
ered only the former, as did Lionel Robbins in his 1932 monograph
[Robbins, 1984]. However, both men modified their earlier posi-
tions: Schumpeter sometime in the 1940s [Schumpeter, 1954] and
Robbins in 1980 [Robbins, 1984]. Nonetheless, the recantations
have not influenced the profession, and the current approach still
honors this distinction. The popular view is that "policies are
theories in action". And according to Occam's law the wiser place to
start is with the display of the theory (i.e., the model).- 2 -
In so doing, I find myself in good methodological company. Hayek, for
one, endorses this method (1).
I term my two basic policy groups the "Kiel-Schumpeter Policy Set" and
the "Principal Keynesian Policy Set". The former I associate with the
views of Herbert Giersch, although he has repeatedly suggested that he
got them from his reading of the works of Joseph A. Schumpeter. The
latter, as the concept is expressed, draws more than a little from Alan
Coddington's metaphor, "the Hydraulic Keynesians" [Coddington, 1976,
pp. 1263-1267].
II. The Kiel-Schumpeter Policy Set
A. General Comments
The Kiel group refers to its position as Schumpeterian [Giersch, 1981;
1985a; 1985b; 1986a; 1986b; 1987]. I am willing to label it thus, but the
label refers to Professor Giersch's interpretation of Schumpeter (2). If
(1) Hayek's point is that the alternative method, the one stressing Car-
tesian abstraction, and pure reason, leads not only to the obvious
failing, a divorce of thought from life, but also to faulty reasoning
associated with incomplete premises [Hayek, 1948]. And Terence
Hutchison made the same point when he noted that Ricardo studied
economics and then sought election to Parliament not to read the
latest truth from Econometrica to the House, but to shape policies
[ Hutchison> 1977]. Economic theory is surely more than rhetoric
(an avenue to persuasion), but it is not coterminous with reason
and truth.
(2) In 1986, in Augsburg, the Joseph A. Schumpeter Intellectual So-
ciety was incorporated. Regardless of whatever else it is, it is a
collection of individuals who see in Schumpeter
1 s many writings the
bases of quite divergent thoughts. Professor Giersch's selection is
not idiosyncratic; my point is that calling something Schumpeterian
is becoming so popular that confusion is likely to result.
Schumpeter, like Keynes before him, has come to symbolize differ-
ent ways of framing economic problems. One frequent reference
point is that Keynes sought to emphasize the immediacy of crisis -
"In the long run we are all dead" - while Schumpeter, the propon-
ent of Kondratieff long cycles, was often long-run oriented. But,- 3 -
I am reluctant to use such an appellation, it is because the Kiel (really
the Giersch) program does not need an adjective taken from his-
tory (1).
Yet, Giersch
1 s -view is that we are now in the Age of Schumpeter
[Giersch, 1987], just as we had been in the Age of Keynes during the
third quarter of this century. His reasoning, as I infer, is that his
policy prescriptions, which surely reflect much of Schumpeterian think-
ing, acquire necessary cachet with the adjective. And his judgment on
such things has generally been better than mine.
Summarily put, the Kiel policy set draws on Schumpeter by arguing
that:
- Ours is a dynamic world, which tends to be chronically short of capi-
tal. There is a constant need to keep interest and profit rates high
enough to encourage household saving as well as entrepreneurial capi-
tal formation (Ricardian reductivism).
- Social efficiency and economic growth are increased if all economic
forces (in the factor as well as in the product markets) are allowed,
indeed encouraged, to transcend national boundaries. National legal
policies should be designed to monitor and prevent the development of
factor and product market price inflexibilities (post-World War II in-
ternational economic interdependency reductivism).
- Economic progress is principally the product of individualistic entre-
preneurs who have been liberated from certain time and technological
constraints by the institutionalization of the industrial corporation
(Schumpeterian entrepreneurialism).
there was more to each than can be discerned by drawing the dis-
tinction between the long and short runs.
(1) Professor Tobin calls much of this program "The Conservative
Counter-Revolution in Economics" [Tobin, 1981],- 4 -
B. Surveying the Policy Choices
The Kiel-Schumpeter policy particulars are:
Welfare and individualism. There is no more basic point to this policy
set than the assertion that welfare is individually, not socially, deter-
mined. Social welfare, thus, becomes a summation of individual posi-
tions, each linked to the other through market participation. Externali-
ties are, consequently, serendipitous, not a principal welfare objective.
Growth. Even so, the Kiel program is a social policy set stressing wide-
spread economic growth which is functionally defined as a society with
continuously-rising individual (household) incomes (1). This growth is
achieved because firms, unimpeded by restraining institutions, increase
their output in so efficient a fashion as to offer workers more employ-
ment and higher real wages (a significantly large portion of which
ought to be saved). Owners can partake of higher profits, while con-
sumers benefit by getting better and cheaper (surely in real-price
terms) goods.
Economic growth flourishes when entrepreneurs function in a climate
which encourages output efficiency. Efficiency is "not just a sometime
thing". Indeed, it requires a continuous free flow of factor resources;
for, if the flow is constrained by barriers or augmented by the inter-
vention of nonmarket considerations ("distortions"), trouble devel-
ops (2).
(1) This position is explicitly different from that of Simon Kuznets
[ 1933], who argued in his seminal article on National Income that it
was neither production nor household income but household con-
sumption which was the key to national welfare.
(2) Giersch has recounted orally how, in 1968, after President de
Gaulle was impelled for political reasons in the interest of civic
stability to raise minimum wages (Giersch calls it the "Wage Re-
volt"), the seeds were planted for the substitution throughout
French industry for decreased employment growth and increased
capital substitution for labor. In 1973, those who controlled the
production of oil used a cartel to expand their earnings (the "Re-
source Holders Revolt") and, in so doing, set up the program
which in the past two or three years has led to a marked reduction- 5 -
Deus ex machina: the critical role of the open market (1). Since real
economic expansion, perceived first in output terms and then in terms
of increased incomes (not necessarily increased comsumption), is the
goal, and this expansion stems from ever-cheaper (more efficiently-pro-
duced) goods and services, the questions are: What is the incentive?
What is the engine? What is its fuel?
The incentive is the private individual's desire to improve (and be per-
sonally responsible for) his or her well-being. The result should be
that individuals, irrespective of what factor role they play, will earn
more, thus permitting them to consume a greater amount and also to
save somewhat more.
Generally, the engine giving force and direction for all of these good
things is the firm, particularly the firm in the private economy.
Upon reflection, the usual fuel is privately-incurred debt. In itself,
creation of debt is not to be feared, since for every debt there must be
an equivalent amount of credit. What is to be feared, however, is the
situation where the amount of debt becomes unrelated to the capacity to
liquidate it. Since one of the institutionally unique aspects of govern-
mental-incurred debt and spending is the ways that government can use
its tax powers to cover its spending errors, there is a Kiel presumption
that private rather than public debt is more efficiently managed. We will
return to this point shortly.
All of the above leads to a stress on accountable economic units (gen-
erally perceived as privately-owned and managed) engaging in free and
competitive interactions. This characterizes the free market. The basic
rule thus becomes reliance upon market determination of prices and
in the demand for oil. In 1980, there was a "Capital Holders Re-
volt", which should lead to increased reliance upon labor, although
not necessarily those workers who wish to "protect" their wage
rates; instead, LDC workers working for lower wages are becoming
the beneficiaries.
(1) Two particularly trenchant analyses of the British application of
this point can be found in Buiter and Miller [1981; 1983].- 6 -
quantities. The market experience (requiring continuous higgling), if
not impeded by regulation, becomes open to all within the national and
international boundaries. Free trade, to trace a popular phrase to its
functional origins, is laissez passer, laissez faire.
Deregulation and privatization. The basic rule is reliance only upon
market determination of prices and quantities. But, why the insistence
upon "control" by the unregulated private economy? The answer is of
two types. The fact that welfare is individually determined is one part
of the answer. In addition, that historical political experience shows
that only in the private economy is there an effective instrument for
destroying inefficient combinations of resources; creditors forcing re-
organization and/or bankruptcy. There is, it seems, no comparable so-
cial equivalent in the public sector for taking losses sufficiently seri-
ously as to "grasp the nettle" to avoid takeovers and/or bankruptcy.
Given the above reasoning, the policy of privatization clearly follows.
The well-recognized advantages under certain specified conditions of
monopolies are admitted (1). But, the presumption is that these will be
privately-owned monopolies, subject to some form of control, be it the
threat of competitors trying to crack the market or even public review.
Insofar as I am aware, the Kiel position on the nature, as well as the
limits, of public control has yet to be spelled out.
The Kiel policy position generally favors deregulation of controls re-
lating to price, entry, and market share (2). Regulations relating to
full economic reporting and honest disclosure do not seem to be incon-
sistent with the general rule.
Competition nationally and internationally. Further questions relate to
how efficiency is to be preserved. As already indicated, the simplified
(1) Schumpeter was hardly condemnatory of monopolies.
(2) In this, the Kiel policy position is Smithian and not Schumpeterian,
because Schumpeter had boundless faith in the disinterestedness of
Consultant Administrators and was not concerned with "quis custo-
diet ipso custodes?", which was the question Smith thought could
not be answered.- 7 -
answer is through competition between firms - competition that is per-
ceived initially as freedom of entry into a specified product or service
market; but, it has other dimensions, as well. Principal among these is
some sort of freedom for entrepreneurial balancing of factor price/out-
put relationships at the margin. The literature on competition - is des-
tructive (cutthroat) competition allowed? (as in Clark [1961]) - tends to
get swallowed by definitions resulting from a general reading of the
GATT rules, which are based on performance rather than market
"structure". This area, involving market action, is one of continuous
experiment; a Hayekian position which the Kiel group appears to ac-
cept (1).
How limitless competition really might become, I cannot say. Whether
Kiel's liberal openness extends to truly worldwide openness (going be-
yond the European-North American-Japanese markets) to include all
markets, I am not sure. It is clear that the Kiel program envisages
competition between all geographical areas (2), but whether it would (in
the face of some of the consequences), argue for the dismantling of
(1) Hayek's interest, and what it involves [Perlman, 1986], in the mar-
ket as a collective price and behavior-signalling institution is fully
compatible with the Kiel-Schumpeter position, so long as the mar-
ket's institutions do not enshrine "insider protection".
(2) The North-South division can be more than between sets of coun-
tries. For instance, Giersch sees Southern Germany, as with all of
Southern Europe (in contrast to Northern Europe), underselling
Northern Germany. Absent factor market rigidities, that situation
ought to right itself - lower worker costs of production (reduced
wages and social security costs as well as cheaper rents) ought to
make Northern Germany more attractive than the South. But, in
Giersch's view the rigidities are enshrined, with the result that
employment opportunities continue to shrink in the North. He calls
this "Institutional Unemployment", really a variant of "Classical Un-
employment" which he contrasts with what Malthus called a glut
where there is deficiency of purchasing power with resulting eco-
nomic stagnation. This latter is in Giersch's lexicon "Keynesian Un-
employment" . Whether North German unit labor costs could ever be
competitive with unit labor costs, let us say in Korea, is problemat-
ical. Giersch's formula would then argue for the North Germans'
turning to some other products or services (if such there be and
which Korea or some other comparable country would not immediate-
ly offer), at prices low enough to be competitive, but high enough
to prelude political action adverse to the government in Bonn.- 8 -
defense and such social service institutions (if tax revues would not
allow them), I cannot say (1). , ,
Price stability. The Kiel group has corollaries to its axiomatic theorem
of economic growth. Price stability (or, at worst, a very low inflation
rate with no commitment to deflation rate) is considered a significantly
useful means, rather than a somewhat subordinated end. In addition, a
policy of steadily-growing employment opportunities can be seen as a
derivative objective, although such a policy is not required to contain a
commitment to an income or wage-rate-maintenance program. Price sta-
bility is perceived as being strengthened by floating, rather than
fixed, exchange rates; this policy, too, receives strong Kiel endorse-
ment.
Uncertainty. Because the Kiel position does not require anyone except
the individual to face the question of ex ante entrepreneurial miscalcu-
lation (its position is Knightian [Knight, 1921], that is, the capability
to take risks successfully is the true rationale for profits), it does not
have to "plan" for social rescue missions. Such rescue missions (i.e.,
military expeditions and governmental programs to help the crippled or
elderly) will certainly occur, but they are seen as outside of the sphere
of "normal economic performance". "Normal economic performance", as
used in this sense, implies that some activities are socially, but are not
necessarily economically normal - e.g., the police and court systems,
public schooling, aid to the handicapped, and so on. The Kiel position
thus preserves clearly and distinctly the analytical barrier between the
economic aspects of industrialized society and its socio-political organi-
zation .
(1) Again, I am taken with Hayek's view that reason plus experience is
the basis for liberal policy. German experience with deregulation is
by American standards limited (it is a country with effective retail
price maintenance, obligatory closing of most retail establishments
from Saturday noon through Sunday as well as on all holidays, and
the like). I am almost sure that, after the fact, the Giersch formu-
lation would temper principle with the consequences of experience.
In any case, I presume that governmental regulation regarding the
sale of addictive narcotics would be acceptable.- 9 -
Central banking. The Kiel group envisions an independent, but publicly-
accountable, monetary authority. This position suggests that there are
limitations to total reliance upon the purely self-regulating aspects of
the market, but that these limitations are met by the creation of a semi-
private institution charged with establishing credit and monetary poli-
cies consistent with cost-reducing production. Kaction taken on the sup-
ply rather than the demand side). Whether this central banking author-
ity works best with rules or ad hocery is not fully specified. The au-
thority has to maintain the conditions for economic growth (which im-
plies commitment to rules), but, it also has to adjust these rules when
it discovers that participants in the market are fully discounting
them (1).
Role of equilibrium analysis. Since growth, rather than redistribution,
is the hallmark of this view, I am prepared to argue that, for the Kiel
group, the concept of equilibrium has almost its own Schumpeterian
"word-of-art" meaning [Seidl, 1984a, pp. 145 ff.]. Judged from the
neoclassical standpoint, any Kiel fascination with achieving and even
maintaining equilibrium (as such) is given a very low priority. Equili-
brium, as such, is a word used in many ways (2), and the Kiel use of
it is worth noting.
(1) My surmise is that the Kiel position reflects its recent historical-in-
stitutional experience with the Bundesbank, which, having the
courage of its (correct) convictions, has taken a hard money posi-
tion. This pattern of action is ascribed by the Kiel group to a sta-
tutory (constitutional?) prohibition of indexing. The Bundesbank's
position, consistent with what the Kiel group advocates, gives the
latter confidence in the current arrangements. Had the Bundesbank
acted otherwise, I believe that the Kiel group would have sought
further to limit legislatively (constitutionally) the discretionary pow-
ers of the bank.
(2) Newtonian equilibrium, where much of the discussion seems to have
started, suggests a body at rest. A terrarium or a balanced aquar-
ium, by way of contrast, suggests another kind of equilibrium, one
that is not at rest, but one which equilibrates one kind of biological
activity (e.g., consumption of inputs) with another (e.g., by-pro-
duct outputs of waste used as the variable factor in the production
of the aforementioned inputs). If these two activities are perfectly
balanced, life within the system (the terrarium or the aquarium)
goes on, but it need not proceed on the original scale. Additional
inputs can be balanced by the production of an equivalent amount- 10 -
From the standpoint of describing the underlying principles or
paradigms of the Kiel approach, any commitment to identification with
Walrasian general equilibrium seems on the balancing of countervailing
(competitive) or complementary flows, rather than on the identification
of long-term (natural) price relationships (1).
Supply side emphasis. The importance of maintaining both domestic and
international competitiveness on the supply side, rather than through
economic stimulation coming from expenditure on public goods and/or
social welfare reform on the demand side, has become the crude ("quick
and dirty") hallmark of the Kiel set of policy choices. The Kiel group
does not seem to find the descriptor demeaning, although Giersch has
clearly and repeatedly stated that the division between policy changes
inspired on either side ultimately affects the other.
C. Summary
Succinctly, this approach is based on the classical macrotheory of total
competition including Free Trade, but applies it to dynamic or growth
economies rather than to what Schumpeter would have thought to be the
of waste outputs. The balance that is being maintained is between
what the inhabitants (vegetation or fish) require and produce, not
a balance which suggests zero-population growth.
Natural price, a phrase popularized by Adam Smith, has suggested
to many a unique equilibrium exchange rate. The word "natural",
however, was used in any one of three ways by him. One meant
"usual"; a second meant "God-given", but the third, the one econo-
mists seem most frequently to draw upon, meant "balanced between
opposing forces". In the biological case, cited above, the plant or
fish census within the. confines of the terrarium or aquarium need,
as we have noted, not be a constant. Thus, that kind of equilib-
rium does not describe a situation at rest, but a situation continu-
ously rebalancing.
(1) Christian Seidl [1984b, pp. 198 f.] has raised an interesting point
in his discussion of Schumpeter's overwhelming emotional attachment
to Walrasian analysis (Seidl refers to Walras being Schumpeter's
Procrustean bed). Does the Kiel position (as with Walras and
Schumpeter) assume that price adjustments are inevitably more ef-
ficient than quantity adjustments?- 11 -
original static situations. In a sense, this is what classical economists
thought they were doing. But, the Kiel Schumpeterian theory goes be-
yond the classical achievement; it incorporates Wicksellian monetary ana-
lysis and the Knightian perception of uncertainty and profits (1).
III. The Principal Keynesian Set
A. The Background
Several years ago, there appeared Alan Coddington's particularly useful
pedagogical survey of the various strands in the Keynesian tradition
[Coddington, 1976] in which he identified three groups of thought.
What defined each group was the way its members handled the inconsis-
tencies in the General Theory. One group was essentially interested in
the purity of the theory - these he called the Fundamentalists. An-
other, and the one relevant to this discussion, he called the Hydraulic
Keynesians, metaphorically associating them with one of the early post-
war models (literally a patentable gadget). The third, principally
Robert Clower and Axel Leijonhufvud, claimed much of the article's at-
tention because they were trying (in Coddington's assessment unsuc-
cessfully) to integrate Keynes' own thinking with the postwar neoclas-
sical efforts found in such places as Cambridge-on-the-Charles.
For us, the point to note was that the Hydraulic Keynesians were prin-
cipally social-policy-oriented (rather than theory- or even "modern"
(1) I do not find this position overlapping the various types of rational
expectations analyses that have been offered, since the latter do
not deal with dynamic situations, and the Kiel group invariably
keeps at least one eye on constantly changing technology. As I
have mentioned, the Kiel group's perception of general equilibrium
is Schumpeterian rather than Walrasian, and, in that sense, focuses
on something different from the currently popular perception of
general equilibrium analysis. I also did not find Hayek's distinction
between cattalacatics and plutocratics helpful in explaining the Kiel
position, since the group is interested both in the dynamic (reloca-
tional) properties of relative price changes and the creation of
wealth.- 12 -
theory-oriented), and they had found in the General Theory something
of a blueprint for socioeconomic engineering, which more of less fitted
what they had in mind (1).
Their interest in social engineering was hardly novel. Perhaps what was
new was not so much the theory itself, but some concomitant events,
which suggested (and many think clearly permitted) an effectiveness
theretofore unknown. Specifically, what I have in mind was the devel-
opment and adoption of wide-spread national income accounting conven-
tions (2).
(1) This craving for what was a demand-management national income
growth policy had hardly started in Keynes
1 time. Malthus,
Sismondi, and Rodbertus each wrote of gluts and the need to help
the poor by giving them something to spend. More specifically, in
1931 a group of American economists meeting with Keynes at the
University of Chicago published a manifesto calling for the govern-
ment to give transfer payments to the poor in order to stimulate the
economy.
(2) In terms of present usage, one does little violence to the truth if
Simon Kuznets
1 article in the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences on
National Income is identified as the seminal contribution [Kuznets,
1933], At about the time that it was eventually published (it had
been written earlier and was known in its prepublication form by
many), Kuznets was asked to create official estimates of the US
national income for the years 1932 and 1933. He assembled a small
staff (including Robert Nathan) and, in an amazingly short time,
not only were these estimates published, but the procedure was
institutionalized in the Department of Commerce. Kuznets then
turned to other tasks, including "cleaning up" one which Jacob
Viner had undertaken but had not been able to finish. This latter
became Kuznets
1 pathbreaking works on US capital formation
[Kuznets, 1937].
When Churchill became Prime Minister in 1940, he drew Keynes into
the War Cabinet's service. Immediately Keynes recommended that a
British national income analysis unit be established, and James
Meade and Richard Stone (quite junior at the time) were recruited.
The two then worked out a set of social accounting conventions
consistent with the Hydraulic Keynesian views, which were almost
immediately accepted by the Washington Department of Commerce
group [Carson, 1975]. (They were also written up in textbook form
by John Hicks [1943].) The American group wrote a vast number of
articles, analyzing wartime changes. These were immediately avail-
able (Gilbert used his previous connection as managing editor of the
Survey of Current Business to secure fast (less than three months)
publication). Thus it was that the Age of Keynes was "officially"
launched.Bibliothek
desInsHtutsfurWeltwirtschatt
By the end of World War II, there was in America considerable political
pressure for using national economic planning (1) to prevent what was
popularly believed was going to occur, a resumption of the stagnation
of the 1930s (2). In the autumn of 1945 and continuing well into 1946,
there was Congressional debate on a Full Employment Act. Eventually
passed in an emasculated form, the Act provided for an information-
offering Council of Economic Advisors (to the President), whose task
was to file an annual report on the state of the economy, but not to
draw up recommendations. It clearly did not provide, much to the dis-
appointment of such stalwarts as Leon Keyserling (its second chairman),
any mandate for economic planning, something which its advocates had
really set as their target.
Meanwhile, Kuznets
1 two efforts (the one involving national income,
the other his analysis of American capital formation) became the ba-
ses for his work on the War Production Board in 1942 and 1943. His
efforts there were astoundingly successful, although at the time he
and Nathan were driven to resign, and the reputation of the Hyd-
raulic Keynesian groups' ability to engineer successfully became
overwhelming [Brigande, 1950].
So much so, that, immediately after the War, those who had taken
over the National Income analysis program published a careful re-
port on the subject [Gilbert et al., 1947], It was reviewed, bitterly
attacked [Kuznets, 1948], and defended by the authors [Gilbert et
al. , 1948]. Kuznets never retreated from his criticisms, and the
national income teams never significantly modified their position,
either. Compare Buiter [1983] for a recent assessment, one probab-
ly in line with much of Kuznet's thinking. The fifteen years of
Kuznetsian effort reveal much about the institutionalization of data
gathering, national income from national product analysis, and
Keynesian theory [Perlman, 1987].
(1) In 1944, Keynes' old antagonist, Sir William Beveridge (then the
Director of the London School of Economics), had published Full
Employment in a Free Society, which offered a nonsocialist vision of
postwar Britain. His colleague, Hayek [1944], responded with what
was intended to be a "pie-in-the-sky"-shattering statement, The
Road to Serfdom. In due course, a third member of the LSE facul-
ty, Barbara Wootton [1946], countered Hayek with her Freedom
under Planning. Others [Finer, 1946; Clark, 1948] got into the
debate about the propriety and consequences of western-style demo-
cratic governments exercising social responsibility for intervening
into the product and factor markets.
(2) Few were the professional economists who predicted the postwar
boom; so few, in fact, that the many who foretold of massive eco-
nomic stagnation suffered little loss of prestige.- 14 -
Nonetheless, by 1947 there was in place in the United States (and, of
course, elsewhere) not only a belief that governments could "stabilize"
employment rates, prices, and growth rates, but that governments
should do so. If the Moses of this effort was Keynes, his priesthood
was a willing group of economists, largely trained at the seminars (sem-
inaries?) held in the two Cambridges.
What was the gospel (the good news)? Summarily put, it is the propo-
sition that the national economy (1) (in part perceived as a complex set
of money flows), while basically marketdriven, is, nonetheless, suscep-
tible to successful manipulation by the federal government, using (if
thought desirable and, possibly, not necessary) the accumulation of
public debt. This intervention involves inter alia the saving, invest-
ment, and consumption processes. One obvious method of manipulation
affecting all three is to stimulate demand for goods and services
through transfer payment programs; either through previously-estab-
lished "entitlements" or those created for the exigencies of a particular
year ("emergency measures"). The dominant purpose for this political
instrument insinuation into the generally market-dominated processes
includes the protection of/provision for what now is termed "basic
human needs" ("freedom from want"). Spelled out, this means the ex-
pansion of employment opportunity and of public sector services (more
recently including environmental improvement). It also includes the ex-
pansion of the provision of economic security for the poor, those ren-
(1) While the Keynesian system was originally nationally autarkic (with
plenty of room for foreign trade), the autarkic element seems to me
to tie into the perception of just where social economic responsibil-
ity lay. Within the United States after 1933, the responsibility for
socioeconomic welfare rested not only not on the local or state gov-
ernments (where from a constitutional standpoint it had previously
been), but also on the federal government. It does little violence to
the common interpretation of post-World War II history to argue that
much of the economic side of American foreign policy has served to
shatter the purely autarkic view. Nonetheless, when "push comes to
shove" (as in the current "protectionist" debate), the Hydraulic
Keynesian hardcore point is that the American federal economic
trade policy must face the "reality" that the federal government
"owes" it to the American unemployed to put their interests first
[Tobin, 1972].- 15 -
dered dependent because of age and health, as well as those whose
poverty is a result of regional economic senescence.
In addition, the Hydraulic Keynesian view is that economic equity is a
high priority social objective. At times, this point has been stressed
more than economic growth [Okun, 1970; 1975].
All of the above is subject to ex ante planning - with, of course, ex
post "indicative" corrections.
B. Surveying the Policy Choices
On a more policy-active level, the Hydraulic Keynesian position has
stressed compensatory fiscal policy; it clearly does not eschew the role
of monetary policy, but subordinates it, believing it to be less effective
than the governmental budget instrument. Examining policy particulars,
we find:
Welfare and social responsibility. According to the Hydraulic Keynesian
view, welfare is seen not only as the individual's own familial (or indi-
vidual) responsibility, but also as a societal duty under certain circum-
stances (those beyond the family's or individual's normal capabilities).
So described, social welfare is something different from a simple summa-
tion of household (family of individual) welfare; there is a synergistic
factor. The provision of externalities can be an objective, not simply a
by-product.
Economic equity and transfer payments. While growth is sometimes (as
during the mid-1960s) advanced as a means to achieving equity (equal-
ity of income, adjusted for differences in age), it is rarely seen as an
objective per se (1). If, historically, economic growth has been per-
ceived as a means to equity, in recent years the emphasis has been on
(1) Second thoughts emerge, but not strong enough to unbend the ar-
gument [cf. Tobin, 1986].- 16 -
nurturing equity, even at the expense of growth. There is a wide-
spread belief, considered by some to be challengeable, that in recent
years, the distribution of household income even after transfer pay-
ments has become more unequal. And, if there is also widespread ac-
knowledgement that the American economy has "enjoyed" a lengthy ex-
pansion (i.e., economic growth), many believe that the loss of momen-
tum in the historic drive for equality has been too great a price to
have paid.
Deus ex Machina. Since social improvement is the obvious goal, and
public policy debate is the usual means, political interaction runs the
system. However, this interaction depends upon an assessment of what
the market-driven economy will do. Thus, the incentive is socioeconomic
redistribution. The engine is the federal budget, and the fuel is a com-
bination of private and public debt. Public debt, once considered a
"neutral" factor, has for years been seen as having an asymmetric
quality ("one cannot push on a string" or "it has been proven to be far
easier to borrow than it is to tax").
Forms of public intervention. In more specific terms, the Hydraulic
Keynesian policy set accepts discretionary monetary policy; even that
engineered by such instruments as the Federal Reserve Board's Open
Market Committee, which is not subject to the election process. The
important point is that this policy encourages wide-spread debate over
what instruments should be used (as well as when and how) to achieve
its socioeconomic objectives [ cf. Thurow, 1985].
Autarkic internal competition and policies designed for an opening ra-
ther than an open economy. Insofar as I can understand the state of
the current debate, few Hydraulic Keynesians believe that the already-
opened Pandora's box of encouraged international economic interdepen-
dency should (much less could) be closed. Rather, there is increasingly
expressed concern whether the United States, currently operating in a
seemingly fully-open economy, can produce sufficient fiscal revenue to
underwrite the costs of its committed social redistribution programs.- 17 -
Perception of the Phillips Curve. The "tradeoff" between inflation and
unemployment has turned out to be an "addictive" relationship, meaning
that the more one becomes accustomed to trying to reduce unemploy-
ment, the more inflation one has to accept. Nonetheless, the Keynesian
Hydraulic set of policy choices lives with the Phillips Curve concept,
albeit with less and less confidence in it, principally because much of
the unemployment is structural. But structural unemployment, too, has
undergone some changes in meaning. One is the increased effects of
rapid technological change, another is the consequences of the break-
down of such "institutions" as the black family. Given these, why does
this set retain any confidence in the Phillips Curve? I infer that the
answer lies in the belief that the dynamic elements in the industriali-
zation development process increasingly make unemployment a function
of structural change more than simple wage rigidities, but that absent
these factors, the tradeoff between unemployment and inflation remains
stable [Gordon, 1983, pp. 290 f.]. It is this belief, as much or more
than any other, which serves as the architectural corner stone of cur-
rent Hydraulic Keynesianism.
Uncertainty. The problem of uncertainty is one of the unresolved as-
pects of the disagreement about "what Keynes really meant". His 1937
article in the Quarterly Journal of Economics [Keynes, 1937] seems to
be in marked conflict with the policy position one can derive from the
last chapter of The General Theory. My preference, indeed the reason
why I find Coddington's article so useful, is to accept the QJE view as
the "theory" and to accept the other as the basis for "policy". Hydrau-
lic Keynesians, in practice, use iterative planning rather than the con-
fident fully ex ante type originally proposed (as in the 1945-1946 Full
Employment Act debates).
Central banking. Any Hydraulic Keynesian policy set must have a prag-
matic test (1). In a better world, the central bank ought to be under
• v
(1) I use the term "pragmatic" as meaning something more than oppor-
tunism. Pragmatism is the philosophic view that in addition to pas-
sing other tests (such as coherence or moral decency), a theory
must "work".- 18 -
the control of the political authorities. As things currently stand, the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is technically inde-
pendent when it comes to policy decisions. In practice, however, the
Board often (but not often enough) keeps a weather eye on what the
Executive and Legislative branches seem to want. Apparently this factor
occasionally suffices and most Hydraulic Keynesians, rhetoric aside, do
not really cavil (1).
Role of equilibrium analysis. If there is anything to Hydraulic Keynes-
ian policy, it is the view that one has to do better than to leave mat-
ters to the equilibrating forces of the market (2). In spite of a desire
to integrate Keynes and Walras, Hydraulic Keynesians do not base their
policy set on even the most dynamic interpretation of equilibrium ana-
lysis.
Demand management emphasis. While "demand management" is often used
(particularly by their critics) to describe the essence of the Hydraulic
Keynesian policy set, I think that it is a secondary characteristic (3),
albeit useful when it comes to contrasting their views with "supply
siders". What Hydraulic Keynesians stress is the moot point that
government can and should successfully intervene in virtually all areas
of socioeconomic concern. That intervention often takes the form mostly
of augmenting aggregate demand, but it need not be restricted to this.
In his American Economic Association Presidential address, for example,
Lawrence R. Klein (whom most identify as a particularly prominent
(1) I found Professor Tobin's assessment of the late Harry Johnson's
eulogy of monetarism particularly appropriate [Tobin, 1981].
(2) One of the common rhetoric misjudgments of our time is the reliance
upon Keynes
1 dictum, "In the long run we are all dead". The full
quotation (with its italics) is much better: "In the long run we are
all dead. Economists set themselves too easy, too useless a task if
in tempestuous seasons they can only tell us that when the storm is
long past the ocean is flat again" [Keynes, 1971, p. 65].
(3) The Economist (6-12 June 1987, p. 30, "Who Cares?") put the mat-
ter thus: "The'old view that unemployment simply reflects a lack of
demand and can therefore be cured by throwing, more money at the
economy has practically vanished".- 19 -
Keynesian) stressed explicitly that the "demand aspects are possibly
overstated" (1).
IV. Conclusions; Antecedent to the Paradigms
My conclusions are based on the belief that the Kiel-Schumpeter position
contains much that differs from that classical reductivist theory, which
served as Keynes's target. For one thing, it is clearly anti-autarkic in
the sense that no-one prior to 1970 dreamed possible (2). In another,
its understanding of monetary theory is perforce post-Keynesian, giving
it a chance both to have considered the Keynesian twists and the sub-
sequent history (3). Finally, Keynes wrote his General Theory as a
tract attacking one kind of social indifference, one based both on polit-
ical blindness and professional incompetence. Not everyone shared his
assessment of that situation, but few, if any, really hold today that the
problems of Britain in the 1930s are congruent with any country's pres-
ent problems.
But the Kiel position does have some clearly reductivist elements. These
include a conviction that the self-regulation of the market process is
(1) Klein's comments were largely directed to the importance of modeling
the supply side, and he specifically sought to draw attention to
Leontief's input-output method as a starting point [Klein, 1978,
pp. 1 ff.].
(2) Karl Pribram [1983] argues that the dominant post-World War II
idea sets were the Keynesian autarkic welfare (responsible) state
and the American commitment to international economic interdepen-
dency.
(3) Schumpeter's failure to complete his massive work on monetary eco-
nomics, really a greater target than the 1954 History of Economic
Analysis, is another reason for questioning the inclusion of
Schumpeter
1 s name in the Kiel-Schumpeter policy set. While
Schumpeter expressed admiration for Fisher's and others' versions
of monetarism, I am not willing to concede that Schumpeter was a
monetarist. Nor, am I sure that Giersch is, if by monetarist one
means total acceptance of the completeness (no less and no more) of
the quantity theory of money.- 20 -
better than public intervention into factor and product/service markets.
If there are structural changes occurring, they are better handled ac-
cording to the reductivist formula (repricing) than they are by subsi-
dies, barriers, and so forth. The reductivist tradition embraces Free
Trade, clearly also a major Kiel commitment.
By way of contrast, the Hydraulic Keynesian position clearly puts
greater, but not all, faith in rational political discussion than it does in
the automaticity of the free market's correction process. In retrospect,
I have found Abba Lerner's The Economics of Control: Principles of
Welfare Economics [1946] the best statement of both the alpha and the
omega of Hydraulic Keynesianism. It incorporates almost all of the re-
ductivist tradition, excepting only those areas where the assumptions of
perfect competition (both on the supply and demand) sides are irrele-,
vant or violated, and where equality is chosen socially as preferential
to efficiency.
The bulk of this essay is an effort to synthesize the underlying theo-
ries. The table below offers a synoptic comparison of the policies. What
remains is to identify the underpinnings. The underpinnings seem to me
to be:
- Individuals choose their theory and policy sets within the context of
their current and historical institutional experience. Claims to, as well
as hopes about, the relative importance of equity or efficiency
(growth (1)) are made on the basis of recent (marginal) experience.
- But, the interpretation of recent marginal experience is idiosyncratic.
The idiosyncratic element rests on two foundations. One is the per-
sonal assessments of uncertainty, itself reflecting each individual's
sense of (endowment with) optimism or pessimism regarding the trend
of future events. The other is whether the individual believes that
planned intervention can successfully thwart the undesirable events.
(1) Efficiency may lead to economic growth. John Stuart Mill, in his
observations on the Stationary State, suggested an alternative,
greater leisure for attention to finer transcendental matters.- 21 -
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- While it is true that some marginal experiences (Britain in the inter-
war decades) tend to exacerbate the tendencies to pessimism, these
are only tendencies, and there are inevitably some who successfully
resist that tide. Conversely, when economic stagnation has generally
been absent from the American scene since World War II, there are
those who have successfully resisted what they have repeatedly
thought were others' Pollyana-ish or Panglossian moods.
As against these foregoing points, there are the factors brought out in
the syntheses:
- Is welfare individually or socially defined?
- Is growth or equity the greater immediate need?
- Is the market mechanism sufficient for economic purposes, or is public
discussion of investment, saving and pricing policies a necessary con-
comitance?
- As a rule, is positive economic intervention (comparable to the traffic
light) freedom-expanding, or is it corrupting and freedom-diminish-
ing?
- Is national social responsibility (as in the modern welfare state) de-
sirable, and, if so, can it be achieved under conditions of total eco-
nomic openness (as when promises made to workers during eras of
prosperity can no longer really be honored, tax revenues having fall-
en due to the shrinking of national economies engaged in unlimited
foreign trade)?
-Are unemployment and price instability directly related, or are there
only some forms of unemployment (nonstructural) and some forms of
price instability (exempting the shock-hysteresis effect) so related?
The paradigms, doubtless, will be subject to greater refinements, im-
provements and better specification. But, it seems to me that the con-
flict is not between varying degrees of refinement, but between the
kinds of considerations which I have termed "the underpinnings".- 23 -
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